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ABSTRACT 
   
Saying, "if Mary had watered Sam's plant, it wouldn't have died," is an ordinary 
way to identify Mary not watering Sam's plant as the cause of its death. But there are 
problems with this statement. If we identify Mary's omitted action as the cause, we 
seemingly admit an inordinate number of omissions as causes. For any counterfactual 
statement containing the omitted action is true (e.g. if Hillary Clinton had watered Sam's 
plant, it wouldn't have died). The statement, moreover, is mysterious because it is not 
clear why one protasis is more salient than any alternatives such as "if Sam hadn't gone to 
Bismarck." In the burgeoning field of experimental metaphysics, some theorists have 
tried to account for these intuitions about omissive causes. By synthesizing this data and 
providing a few experiments, I will suggest that judgments - and maybe metaphysics - 
about omissive causes necessarily have a normative feature. This understanding of 
omissive causes may be able to adequately resolve the problems above. 
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Introduction 
 David Lewis thought that absences are spooky. In a way, he was right. That an 
omission of an event could cause another event does seem mysterious, for no positive 
event or force is present to cause the result. Yet, omissions do not usually spook us as 
non-philosophers. It is common to say things like, “the lack of space at the restaurant 
caused us to choose a different venue.” Of course, one might think that omissions as such 
can be rephrased as positive events: “the crowding at the restaurant caused us to choose a 
different venue.” But sometimes it seems as if it is truly an omission that caused some 
other event; for instance, we might say, “the lack of vitamin C causes scurvy.” 
Nonetheless, just as not all positive events are causes, not all omissions are causes. It is 
odd to say, “the rope not breaking caused Susan to make it to the top of the rope she 
climbed,” or “not throwing the rock at the window caused it not to break.” It seems, 
hence, that we need some account of when omissions are causes. 
 In this thesis, I will make a few suggestions about omissions and our intuitions 
about omissions qua causes. I will put forward an account of why I think some omissions 
are causally salient and why others are not so. To do this, I will rely on literature from the 
metaphysics of causation. I will also use experimental data and provide some 
experiments. In section two, I will give a defense of using experimental philosophy to 
discuss metaphysics. 
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Why Do Experimental Metaphysics? 
Prima facie, it is false that the studying non-philosophers’ intuitions about 
metaphysical thought experiments is philosophically important; while it may be 
interesting to psychologists or sociologists, the endeavor is insignificant to philosophers. 
Such methodologies where philosophers derive metaphysical theories from a description 
of the folk practice appear to be is-ought traps. Folk intuitions or judgments about 
philosophical cases, moreover, seem irrelevant to philosophers who can form their own – 
maybe more precise – judgments; philosophers are, some may say, trained in the art of 
intuiting. Despite these qualms, many contemporary philosophers find it significant to 
study non-philosophers’ intuitions about metaphysical – and other philosophical - cases. 
They think that if they were to learn some fact about ordinary judgments, it may 
encourage them to revise their metaphysical theories that deviate from ordinary 
judgments. There are many concerns related to this project, but in order to make the 
inferential leap from describing the folk conceptions of metaphysics to revising 
theoretical ones, we must answer a further question: when – if it does at all – does 
experimental evidence merit a revision to metaphysical theory? 
 Because most of the work done on this question has been in ethics – particularly 
in theories of moral responsibility – I will describe what I think is a strong position on the 
project of experimental philosophy in relation to theories of moral responsibility. I will 
then suggest that the answer I support carries over to the metaphysical project. 
Experimentation and Moral Responsibility 
Philosophers assume theories of moral responsibility employ the same criteria for 
every responsibility judgment. Specifically, they assume the right criteria will have no 
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exceptions. Recent experimental evidence, however, suggests that folk responsibility 
judgments vary from case to case. That is, these folk judgments reveal pervasive 
exceptions to what are assumed to be invariant criteria. Because of these results, some 
philosophers like Knobe and Doris argue that we should revise our moral theories to 
accord with pervasively variantist folk responsibility judgments. But before we make 
inferences from describing folk conceptions of responsibility to revising theoretical ones, 
we must answer a further question: when does this experimental evidence merit a 
revision to theories of moral responsibility? 
Assumption of Invariance 
Knobe and Doris introduce the assumption of invariance for moral theories of 
responsibility.
1
  By this assumption, philosophers suppose moral theories can employ the 
same basic criteria for all responsibility judgments. The criteria (and each individual 
criterion) for making responsibility judgments do not change because of consideration for 
the persons involved, relationships, circumstances, context, and other normative 
judgments.
2
 The assumption is that theories ought to omit such considerations as germane 
aspects of moral responsibility judgments. Hence, the criteria, avoiding emotional or 
contextual interference, are rule-based or reason responsive. 
In light of the assumption, there are two types of moral theories of responsibility: 
invariantism and variantism. Under invariantism, a theory employs the same criteria in all 
cases where people make a responsibility judgment. For variantism, there is at least one 
                                               
1
 Knobe, Joshua and Doris, John. “Strawsonian Variations: Folk Morality in the Search for a 
Unified Theory.” The Handbook of Moral Psychology (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 2-3. 
2
 These features seem very general. And they are. Nonetheless, the point is that the invariant 
criteria established by the theory are the only determining factors for responsibility judgments. 
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case in which a variant responsibility ascription principle applies as an exception to the 
standard criteria. In the literature, variantism has been defined broadly. Moral intuitions 
vary not just because of morally relevant (or not morally relevant) differences between 
cases but also because of differences in framing or in describing the question. If people 
have conflicting intuitions about a single case, then we would be wrong to call their folk 
theory variantist; they simply need to sort out their intuitions. If, however, people employ 
different criteria in different cases, this difference can be called variantist because there is 
at least one exception to the standard criteria employed. Notably, variantism has been 
construed in such a way that the different criteria do not have to vary because of morally 
relevant factors or because of differences between cases; as long as there is some 
exception to the criteria, we can consider a theory as variantist.
3
 
 Theories of moral responsibility traditionally assume invariance. A compatibilist 
view of determinism and moral responsibility, for instance, is invariantist. Under this 
view, a person is morally responsible for some action - even in a deterministic universe. 
These responsibility judgments are based on invariant criteria. For instance, Frankfurt’s 
real self view, as many interpret it, suggests that people are morally responsible for 
behaviors that stem from second-order volitions.
4
 Under this invariantist theory, moral 
                                               
3
 I will address concerns about this view later in this chapter. 
4
 As an aside, this seems to be how Knobe and Doris (and many others) read Frankfurt, but it is 
not how Frankfurt reads himself; he does not think his notion of the free will has much bearing on 
moral responsibility because someone “may be morally responsible for having done [something] 
even though his will was not free at all.” See Frankfurt, Harry. “Freedom of the Will and the 
Concept of a Person.” In The Importance of What We Care About (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), 23. Knobe and Doris look to a different, less precise passage: Frankfurt, 
Harry. “Three Concepts of Free Action” in The Importance of What We Care About (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), 53-4. Interestingly, this emendation makes clear the 
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responsibility judgments do not vary in different contexts or in relation to a particular 
individual. The only determining factor for moral responsibility is the criterion proffered 
by the theory; no other considerations are taken into account, and the criterion applies 
equally in each case. 
Experimental Data 
 Knobe and Doris observe an inconsistency: while moral theories hold the 
assumption of invariance, ordinary people seemingly do not make responsibility 
judgments based on invariant criteria.
5
 Because folk responsibility judgments lack these 
invariant criteria, it is easy to develop counterexamples to invariant moral theories: that 
is, it is easy to find cases where one’s responsibility judgment deviates from the judgment 
expected by a theory’s criteria. For Knobe and Doris, if a philosopher wants to obviate 
counterexamples to her theory and to develop a theory that accords with folk 
responsibility judgments, she must first identify the influences on these judgments. 
 A common way to discuss moral responsibility is to claim that an agent is 
responsible if she caused an event and brought it about intentionally. A theory of 
responsibility, under such an account, is invariant because causation and intentionality 
are invariant; specifically, the criteria used to make intentionality and causation 
judgments do not vary, and because these judgments do not vary, responsibility 
judgments employing these concepts – likewise – do not vary. 
                                                                                                                                            
contention between invariantism and variantism; someone who holds that there is a strong 
connection between free will and moral responsibility holds a specific invariantist view, but she 
can still express counterexamples and variant cases where moral responsibility judgments do not 
correlate with her concept of free will. 
5
 Knobe, Joshua and Doris, John, “Strawsonian Variations,” 6-7. 
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Knobe, Doris, and others, however, conducted experiments suggesting that the 
criteria for applying these core elements of responsibility judgments vary systematically. 
Specifically, the Knobe Effect, or the Side-Effect Effect, indicates that differences in the 
moral status of an event or a side-effect affect intentionality judgments. If, for instance, 
the moral status of a side-effect is bad, as opposed to good, people judge the agent 
performing the action as acting intentionally.
6
 In a between-subjects study,
7
 Knobe 
developed a vignette about a CEO who is asked to implement a new program. In one 
condition, the program has the side-effect of helping the environment, and in the other it 
has the side-effect of harming the environment. Researchers asked participants if the 
CEO intentionally harmed/helped the environment. 82% of participants claimed that the 
CEO intentionally harmed the environment, and 77% of participants said he 
unintentionally helped it. This highly replicated study suggests that there is an asymmetry 
in folk intentionality judgments. Specifically, when there is a bad side-effect of an 
agent’s action, people judge the agent as acting intentionally. 
Researchers have also found that causal judgments systematically vary based on 
normative judgments. In a between-subjects study, a vignette describes a receptionist in a 
                                               
6
 Knobe, Joshua. “Intentionally Action and Side-Effects in Ordinary Language.” Analysis 63 
(2003): 190-194. 
7
 In a between-subjects study, researchers study participants’ responses to one condition of the 
experiment; that is, one group of participants responds to one experimental condition, and other 
groups respond to other conditions. In a within-subjects study, researchers study participants’ 
responses to all of the experimental conditions. Suppose we are studying people’s attitudes 
towards marijuana before and after its legalization in Washington. If we conduct a between-
subjects study, one group’s attitudes will be measured before marijuana is legalized and an 
entirely different group’s attitudes will be measured after the law is passed. If we conduct a 
within-subjects study, we will measure the attitudes of one group of participants before and after 
the passing of the law. 
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philosophy department who keeps her desk stocked with pens. Administrative assistants 
are allowed to take the pens, but faculty members are not allowed to take them. Despite 
the restriction, both the administrative assistants and the faculty members typically take 
pens. One morning, one of the administrative assistants and Professor Smith take pens. 
Later that day, the receptionist needs to take an important message, but there are no pens 
left on her desk. Researchers asked participants to indicate on a Likert scale whether they 
agreed or disagreed with two statements - one identifying Professor Smith as the cause of 
the secretary's problem and the other identifying the administrative assistant as the 
cause.
8
 The results show that people judge Professor Smith to be the cause of the problem 
and that they do not judge the administrative assistant to be the cause.
9
 
The two behaviors, however, do not differ in typicality; it is routine for both 
Professor Smith and the administrative assistant to take pens.
10
 The rate of occurrence of 
both events, moreover, is statistically similar. There are also multiple ways to intervene; 
one, for instance, could prevent the administrative assistant from taking a pen. The 
original researchers, Knobe and Fraser, suggest that the principal difference between the 
actions is their moral statuses; Professor Smith is not supposed to take the pens, while the 
                                               
8
 Knobe, Joshua and Fraser, Ben. “Causal Judgment and Moral Judgment: two experiments.” In 
Moral Psychology. Edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008). 
9
 Knobe, Joshua. “Person as Scientist, Person as Moralist.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 
(2010): 315. 
10
 Interestingly, some researchers have recently found that typicality may play a larger role in 
causal judgments; specifically, they found that folk causal ascriptions are sensitive to agent-level 
typicality – not population-level statistical norms. This view goes against the consensus view – 
what I call the norm view – accepted by Knobe, Driver, and others. I have to omit a defense of 
this attack because of limits on scope and length, but I do think that the norm view can subsume 
the typicality attack. See Sytsma, J., J. Livengood, and D. Rose. “Two Types of Typicality: 
Rethinking the Role of Statistical Typicality in Ordinary Causal Attributions.” Studies in History 
and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences (2011). 
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administrative assistant is permitted to do so. If the moral difference between the 
vignettes elicits a different causal ascription, then this study suggests that people do not 
make causal judgments as scientists do - considering only statistics. Furthermore, causal 
judgments - like judgments of intentionality – vary; that is, people are more likely to 
ascribe causation to an event where a norm is broken. 
A large body of evidence suggests that intentionality and causal judgments vary. 
Intentionality judgments vary because of the normative status of a related event or a side-
effect. Causal judgments vary because of normative considerations. Because these 
judgments are components of folk responsibility judgments, these variations suggest that 
ordinary responsibility judgments vary as well. 
One might, however, suggest that philosophers fail to give a precise account of 
how the folk make responsibility judgments; that is, when making a responsibility 
judgment, ordinary people might not consider intentionality or causation at all. Hence, we 
might avoid examining causation and intentionality. Instead, we might simply examine 
the actual folk responsibility judgments. 
Roskies and Nichols (among others) have found an asymmetry between abstract 
and concrete cases in people’s judgments of moral responsibility.11 In their between-
subjects experiment, they had two conditions. In the actual condition, the vignette 
described a deterministic universe like our own. In the alternate condition, it described 
deterministic Universe A, which was described exactly like our universe. The only 
difference between the vignettes was that one universe was our own and the other was 
                                               
11
 Roskies, Adina and Nichols, Shaun. “Bringing Moral Responsibility Down to Earth.” Journal 
of Philosophy 105 (2008): 371-388. 
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Universe A. In each case, a character performed some action for which they could be 
found responsible. Roskies and Nichols found that in the universe like our own, people 
gave more compatibilist responses to questions of moral responsibility. This finding, 
often called the abstract/concrete paradox, suggests responsibility judgments vary based 
on abstract and concrete conditions. 
Knobe and Doris see the abstract/concrete paradox
12
 as one of the influences on 
the criteria that people use when making responsibility judgments – a feature encouraging 
people to apply different criteria under different conditions: that is, people apply 
compatibilist criteria in concrete cases and incompatibilist criteria in abstract cases.
13
 
Hence, Knobe and Doris suggest that the only theory that can accord with folk 
responsibility judgments is one that generates different judgments under abstract and 
concrete conditions. This factor, I must note, is only one of many. 
Variantism 
Many experimental philosophers suggest the experimental results show that 
people do not use consistent criteria for all responsibility judgments. Instead, folk 
responsibility judgments depend on different criteria in each case, or they have numerous 
exceptions to criteria.
14
 The evidence, as many philosophers and physiologists take it, 
sufficiently shows that ordinary responsibility attribution is pervasively variantist. 
                                               
12
 For an explanation of why this is a paradox, see: Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. “Abstract + 
Concrete = Paradox.” In Experimental Philosophy. Edited by Joshua Knobe and Shaun Nichols. 
(New York: Oxford University Press 2008). 
13
 Knobe, Joshua and Doris, John, “Strawsonian Variations,” 7-10. 
14
 These are two distinct claims. One says that different criteria apply in different cases, and the 
other says that there are exceptions to criteria because of the influence of a feature outside of the 
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But it is a bit hasty to argue that the evidence is sufficient to make these claims 
about ordinary responsibility judgments. To justify this claim, we may look to further 
experimental results. In a study by Pinillos et al, the researchers hypothesized that 
subjects in a better epistemic condition are less likely to display the Knobe Effect.
15
 To 
corroborate their theory, they performed three experiments. In one of these experiments, 
the researchers gave subjects a cognitive reflection test (CRT) and hypothesized that 
those who score higher on it will be less likely to display the Knobe Effect. Their results 
showed a reduction in the Knobe Effect: people who scored higher on the CRT showed 
less of an asymmetry between the two cases. In another experiment, participants were 
given both vignettes (help and harm), and the researchers found a dramatic decrease in 
asymmetry of the Knobe Effect. 
This study suggests that Knobe and Doris’ inference from their amalgamation of 
studies might be hasty; that is, they cannot infer from this body of evidence that ordinary 
responsibility judgments are always variantist. For it seems that when people have 
improved epistemic conditions, we have reason to believe that their judgments will not 
vary as significantly. This result may suggest that the influences Knobe and others have 
identified are potentially less serious, for they stem from a mistake or an interference 
with good intuitions. While Pinillos’ study encourages more experimentation, it ought to 
encourage experimental philosophers to be a bit more careful with the inferences made 
from their results. 
                                                                                                                                            
criteria. The abstract/concrete condition is like the former, and the Knobe Effect is like the latter 
claim. 
15
 Pinillos, N. Á. Et al. “Philosophy's New Challenge: Experiments and Intentional Action.” Mind 
& Language 26 (2011): 8. 
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 Hence, there is at least one reservation about the recent experimental results: they 
may not sufficiently show that people’s judgments of moral responsibility are variantist. 
There needs to be further evidence to sufficiently make this case. Experimental 
philosophers want to show how intuitions - as a result of people’s underlying competence 
- vary in systematic ways.
16
 
17
 But this project, while growing clearer and finding 
interesting results, is still incomplete.
18
 Notably, not all psychological patterns are clear, 
for some may be a mistake or an inconsistency.
19
 Yet, most theorists corroborating these 
theses argue these intuitions vary in justifiable ways.
20
 
Data and Moral Theories 
                                               
16
 These researchers hope to discover the psychological mechanisms responsible for varying 
intuitions. See Knobe, Joshua. “Person as Scientist, Person as Moralist.” Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences 33 (2010): 315-365. In this work (as in others), he propounds an overarching theory of 
the person as a moral scientist: that is, people’s moral judgments are prior to all other judgments 
and systematically influence one’s competence to make all other judgments. To see a systematic 
explanation of the abstract/concrete paradox, see Mandelbaum, Eric and Ripley, David. 
“Explaining the Abstract/Concrete Paradoxes in Moral Psychology: The NBAR Hypothesis.” 
Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (2011): 351-368. 
17
 This goal of experimental philosophy may be phrased differently. It could be that experimental 
philosophy aims to reveal previously unrecognized variations in judgments or that it aims to show 
variation in conceptual competence. 
18
 At this point, one may raise a concern about interference with intuitions. Specifically, one may 
claim that while it may seem that the normative status of an event affects people’s causal 
judgments, it is not the case that people’s underlying competence to make (for instance) causal 
ascriptions depends on norms (to see a written form of this view, see Alicke, Mark. “Blaming 
Badly.” Journal of Cognition and Culture 8 (2008): 179-186.). While I cannot do justice to this 
attack here, it is important to note that Knobe and some others do not think that the experiments 
show interference with intuitions; they think that normative judgments affect causal/responsibility 
judgments as a part of our underlying competence (Knobe, Joshua and Doris, John, “Strawsonian 
Variations,” 30-1). For example, Knobe thinks that moral norms being broken help people 
identify the relevant counterfactual statement in causal judgments (see Knobe, Joshua. “Folk 
Judgments of Causation.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 40 (2009): 238-242.) 
19
 These mistakes may also be explained psychologically. 
20
 Doris, John. “Variantism about Responsibility.” Philosophical Perspectives 25 (2007): 183-
214. 
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Putting aside these qualms and giving charity to these well-supported findings, 
there remains the question of how much theoretical weight we can give experimental 
results. We ought to ask: to what extent do these data merit a revision to theories of moral 
responsibility? 
While Knobe and Doris think their project has psychological implications, they 
more controversially suggest that it has implications for moral philosophy. They foresee 
themselves finding some systematic patterns by which intuitions vary based on 
underlying psychological competencies. This thesis is a psychological one, one that 
(despite my hesitance to accept it) they have good evidence to bolster. This psychological 
account, however, is distinct from the normative one about who ought to be responsible. 
Despite this distinction, they argue that their data and the variantist psychological thesis 
motivate theories of moral responsibility to avoid invariant criteria. This radical view 
deserves some attention, for it is not clear why moral theories should be responsive to 
data about ordinary intuitions. 
There are two views one could hold about this concern: conservatism and 
revisionism.
21
 Conservatives think that ordinary intuitions are for the most part right. 
Hence, these theories take first-order judgments seriously and accord with them as much 
as possible. Under this view, intuitions about causation, for instance, are correct, and 
when we use these to decipher moral responsibility, our judgment is also correct. A 
conservative takes variantist data seriously. Revisionists, on the other hand, think that 
intuitions 1) often deviate from what we have reason to believe is theoretically correct or 
2) are wrong about the world. Either way, intuitions should be revised by a theory. By 
                                               
21
 Knobe, Joshua and Doris, John, “Strawsonian Variations,” 32. 
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this account, a theory about responsibility is thought to have good and correct criteria for 
making such judgments, so it can correct people’s deviant judgments. Many classroom 
philosophy professors might see themselves as revisionist, revising the faulty intuitions of 
their students. A revisionist does not take variantist data seriously. 
While appealing, both views seem tenuous. Strict revisionism seems odd because 
the correction of folk intuitions seems to enable (without good reason) a theory to 
substantiate some intuitions and not others; such a view allows for the correction of 
intuitions that deviate from one theory and gives weight to those that corroborate it. The 
view does not need to answer to intuitions. It does, however, require a story explaining 
why some intuitions are incorrect. Strict conservatism, in contrast, seems odd because 
simply relying on our intuitions assumes that we are rarely wrong about morality. Our 
intuitions, however, often are wrong about the world, so it is strange for us to solely rely 
on them. Under this view, we need an account of why our ordinary intuitions are good 
ones. Rightly, Knobe and Doris suggest the correct moral theory is probably between 
these extremes. If one tends toward either extreme, one gets inaccurate theories. 
To settle this tension, we may find principles that justify a preference for one 
view over the other or that tell us when we should be conservative or revisionist. Some 
have developed such principles. One, introduced by Vargas, is normative adequacy, or 
the idea that revision should be constrained where innovation does not accord with our 
network of mutually supporting norms and practices.
22
 If a theory introduces a norm or 
practice that creates discord within this nexus, then the theory’s revision of ordinary 
                                               
22
 Vargas, M. “Responsibility and the Aims of Theory: Strawson and Revisionism.” Pacific 
Philosophical Quarterly 85 (2004): 230. 
 14 
 
judgments should be constrained. Under this principle, if folk morality turns out to be 
pervasively variantist, then strict invariantist revisionism ought to be constrained; for the 
invariant theory creates significant discord with the nexus of ordinary norms and 
practices. But the extent to which a moral theory might reasonably violate normative 
adequacy remains unclear, for there is almost always some degree of tension between 
theory and intuition. 
Revisionary invariantism, in contrast, has a few justifying principles under what 
Doris calls revisionary prestige. Doris highlights three types of such prestige. One type is 
instrumental success: invariantism has instrumental success because it ameliorates more 
moral dilemmas. Some theories of medicine have instrumental success if they apply 
consistently and cure more illnesses. Likewise, a revisionary invariantist theory may have 
instrumental success if it applies the same criteria in every case and solves many moral 
dilemmas. The second type of prestige is explanatory power. Invariantist theories have 
explanatory power to justify judgments of moral responsibility – they have a theory to 
explain the correct moral judgments – which folk morality lacks. Such theories also can 
explain why ordinary intuitions vary: because, for instance, they are making performance 
errors. The last type of prestige is expert consensus. In medical fields, experts do not 
track folk remedies. Luckily, we do not depend on the cure for the flu that my mother 
used to give me (honey and whiskey in warm orange juice). We depend on expert 
consensus to develop flu vaccines. Likewise, we should depend on expert philosophical 
consensus about moral theories – not what our intuitions tell us.23 
                                               
23
 Doris, John. “Variantism about Responsibility,” 205-6. 
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From these principles, conservatives have normative adequacy, while revisionists 
have what has been called prestige. To be clear, conservatives have a principle that binds 
a moral theory to accordance with a nexus of norms and practices, and revisionists have 
one that gives precedence to theories that have instrumental success, explanatory power, 
and expert consensus. One may, nonetheless, wonder if these principles are distinct and at 
odds; specifically, could a theory lack normative adequacy yet have prestige (or vice 
versa)? If not, then these principles are fruitless and ineffective. 
It seems likely that there is overlap between normative adequacy and prestige, yet 
it is not implausible that theories fulfill one principle and lack the other. Under a 
Frankfurtian theory of moral responsibility, for example, the theory may have 
instrumental success and lack normative adequacy.
24
 The theory successfully gives good, 
consistent criteria for responsibility judgments: one is morally responsible if she acts 
because of her second-order volition; that is, the theory has instrumental success. Yet, the 
theory also conflicts with the nexus of our norms and practices; it is common for us to 
judge someone as responsible simply if the action stems from a first-order desire. This 
response may not satisfy those who think that if the theory does not account for folk 
judgments, then it lacks instrumental success. But someone arguing from the prestige 
principle can suggest that instrumental value does have to account for these judgments; it 
simply has to solve more dilemmas, which the Frankfurtian view does (i.e. free will and 
moral responsibility). While it seems that these principles are distinct, they only 
encourage the standstill. We still require a precise principle to determine when we ought 
to be conservative or revisionist. 
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There is, however, a further principle that requires attention: what has been called 
the moral-epistemological assumption (MEA). This is the assumption that our first-order 
intuitions about concrete cases justify our moral theories.
25
 Specifically, the best moral 
theory explains more of our intuitions. To move the debate between revisionism and 
conservatism forward, we must consider to what extent moral theories must accord with 
our intuitions. An explication of this principle will limit a radical stance on either 
position.
26
 
When a scientific theory is proposed, it must be empirically adequate. If a theory 
is not empirically adequate because it cannot be verified by results, then it fails to be a 
good theory. Even a good theory, nonetheless, has anomalies in the data that contradict it, 
but these anomalies will not necessarily make the theory null. As Kuhn noted in his work 
on the history of scientific revolutions, anomalies arise in normal science and sometimes 
penetrate the field pervasively enough to permeate the paradigm.
27
 But even when results 
contradict a theory, there needs to be an empirically adequate alternative to take its place. 
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And if there are a set of empirically adequate theories to choose from, there may be other 
considerations to justify a choice. To a greater degree than Kuhn, van Fraassen saw 
empirical adequacy as a necessary tenet of scientific understanding.
28
 His scientific 
constructivism said science provides empirically adequate theories and the acceptance of 
its theories involves a belief that they are empirically adequate.
29
 
There is an analogy between science and ethics in that an ethical theory needs to 
be empirically adequate; that is, an ethical theory necessarily adopts MEA. Someone may 
have immediate resistance to this analogy, for while science is descriptive, moral theories 
are prescriptive. While this concern seems apt, it is not precise. Even for prescriptive 
theories, we necessarily rely on empirical evidence - our intuitions (as in MEA) – to 
justify our theories. 
We may, nonetheless, have some qualifications for MEA. The first is that there 
must be a minimum degree of empirical adequacy. If some other theory accords with no 
intuitions, then the theory seems obviously false. For instance, a theory of moral 
responsibility that claims X is responsible iff X loves Billy Joel accords with no 
intuitions. Any reasonable moral theory, thus, necessarily accords with some intuitions - 
although it is unclear to what extent it must do so. 
MEA may be clearer if we examine its use in the development of moral theories. 
There are at least two ways to develop a moral theory. In one way, the moral theory 
accords with some other philosophical theory and has no initial bearing on our intuitions. 
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For instance, the way in which many interpret Frankfurt is that his concept of free will 
provides a theory of responsibility.
30
 
But if his theory greatly conflicted with our intuitions, this theory would be null; 
strong intuitions, in turn, sometimes encourage us to modify theories when a theory 
cannot account for a lot of them. There is an example of this in the metaphysics of 
causation. Ned Hall committed to a theory of generative causation, but he was led to 
develop two concepts of causation because his theoretical commitment conflicted with 
his causal intuitions about counterfactual dependence, omissions, and productive 
causation.
31
  Seemingly, intuitions justify changes to some theories. But it remains 
unclear when our intuitions serve this purpose. 
The second way that we develop a moral theory is by making an inference to the 
best explanation based on a set of intuitions. Again, we cannot ignore the debt the theory 
pays to our intuitions. Based on how theories develop, there needs to be some adherence 
to MEA. To ignore novel data that conflicts with the original data used to develop a 
theory would be tendentious. 
But beyond the basic requirement of MEA, it is unclear which intuitions count for 
or against a theory. Often in philosophy, we use ordinary intuitions to develop 
counterexamples. For instance, to challenge utilitarianism, one develops a case where we 
must murder a patient in a hospital to save five others. Few people, given this case, will 
express utilitarian intuitions. Hence, many suggest that this case fuels resistance towards 
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utilitarianism. Yet, others suggest that this counterexample has no bearing on the overall 
theory. Philosophers, hence, seem to lack a set standard for examining the extent to 
which intuitions must accord with moral theories. 
I have suggested that we rely heavily on our intuitions to develop, modify, and 
justify moral theories. I have also noted that it is unclear which intuitions count as 
evidence under MEA. It is odd to claim that all intuitions count or that no intuitions 
count, but it is not clear which ones do count. The question is: to what extent can our 
intuitions be said to justify our moral theories? In other words, to what extent does MEA 
hold? 
One conservative proposal is to suggest that intuitions that justify theories are 
those that go through rigorous empirical studies. Call this proposal the search for good 
intuitions. Seemingly, experimental data is a more representative way to determine 
general intuitions than armchair philosophy; rather than picking particular intuitions, 
philosophers now have an accurate measure of general intuitions. Under this proposal, if 
intuitions about moral responsibility vary, then invariant theories violate MEA. And 
Knobe and others have suggested that intuitions do vary in systematic ways. Thus, we 
should discard invariant moral theories because the good intuitions oppose them. 
This proposal, however, is hasty and incomplete. Someone may object that the 
experimental studies are performed on non-philosophers, so these intuitions are not 
adequate for philosophical theories. The intuitions traditionally used in philosophy are 
those of well-practiced and introspective philosophers: trained expert intuiters. This 
 20 
 
expert-intuiter objection, however, has come under fire.
32
 This concern is also empirical 
and requires a defense; that is, there needs to be evidence to show that philosophers 
actually are expert intuiters.
33
 This evidence, however, is difficult to manifest. But if one 
shows that philosophers expertly intuit, the objection holds. 
There is a second objection to the search for the good intuitions. Even if we find 
that folk have pervasively variant intuitions, we must also show that these intuitions are 
correct or good. Conservatives, hence, require a further argument for why folk variantism 
should be preserved in ethical theory; that is, they need to show that conserved variantist 
intuitions are correct. Notably, they do not require an argument for why variant intuitions 
are good in general, but they need to explain why intuitive exceptions to invariant criteria 
are good in each individual case. 
In a recent article, Kumar and Campbell highlight this objection. They suggest 
that experimental work can help philosophers determine which features of cases engender 
divergent responses: what they call a psychologically efficacious difference.
34
 For 
instance, in the abstract/concrete cases, experimenters found that subjects’ intuitions 
diverge because of the way in which a case is framed. But Kumar and Campbell argue 
that philosophers require a further step for these experiments to elicit revision to moral 
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theories; philosophers need to show that the different features identified by experiments 
are of normative significance. That is, philosophers need to argue whether these 
differences are normative differences or non-normative ones. 
Once these arguments are made, philosophers can use these normatively 
significant differences to identify the correct intuitions. Kumar and Campbell use 
consistency reasoning to resolve inconsistencies.
35
 Essentially, this technique means that 
they treat all cases alike to expose or resolve inconsistencies in judgments about concrete 
cases.
36
 When data expose a difference between intuitions about similar cases and 
philosophers have argued that the difference is normatively significant or not, they must 
resolve or expose this inconsistency. To resolve an inconsistency, a revisionist revises 
those intuitions elicited by non-normative features. To expose an inconsistency, a 
conservative identifies a previously unrecognized morally relevant feature. 
If we return to the experimental work described above, it seems that the variantist 
experiments identify some normative and some non-normative features. So, there are two 
ways to react to psychological variantism: 1) admit all facts about the cases into moral 
theories and be highly conservative or 2) admit only morally relevant facts and be 
conservative about some things yet not others. The second view seems like the best 
response to these data, for it is odd to allow non-normative features into moral theories. 
Nonetheless, the features eliciting the variantist response all require arguments – some 
that will be difficult to generate. For instance, the abstract/concrete cases seem to vary 
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because of facts about the way they are described, but cases like the Knobe Effect seem 
to differ because of normatively significant facts (i.e. the moral status of the side effect). 
There are also borderline cases that involve one’s relationship to another agent, emotions, 
and sentiments. All of these features require arguments to admit them or reject them from 
moral theories, so it seems that we have created a lot of work for the future experimental 
philosopher. 
 Doris, Knobe, and others have convincingly made a psychological claim that folk 
judgments of moral responsibility are variantist. Controversially, they argue that their 
findings merit modifications to invariantist moral theories of responsibility. I have 
suggested that this elicitation is correct with some qualifications. The first is that a theory 
needs to minimally accord with first-order intuitions. The second qualification is that 
intuitions the data describe still require an argument (something like consistency 
reasoning) for them to be the correct or relevant intuitions. I have attempted to give a less 
hasty account of how experimental philosophy can influence moral theories, and I have 
suggested that experimental endeavors are not is-ought traps or wastes of time. 
Experimentation and Metaphysics 
 The discussion in the previous section illuminates what experimental metaphysics 
– as I see it – is doing. That is, experiments on people’s ordinary judgments reveal 
psychologically efficacious differences between different cases – differences that may 
reveal previously unnoticed features of cases that influence, bias, or distort metaphysical 
judgments. These features, once revealed by the studies, may be used by revisionists to 
eliminate distorted judgments or taken up by conservatives to revise the metaphysical 
theory. This dialectic may best be seen as a process: 
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1. Assume MEA1 (metaphysical-epistemological assumption).
37
 
2. Experiment on people’s judgments about metaphysical cases. 
3. If one finds a psychologically efficacious difference between two cases, then one 
must determine whether or not that difference is metaphysically significant. 
4. This determination can be done by using consistency reasoning. If two judgments 
are inconsistent because of a psychologically efficacious difference, the 
inconsistency can be resolved by revising the less tenable judgment. If a 
psychologically efficacious judgment in untenable, it ought to be revised. If, 
however, the psychologically efficacious difference is metaphysically significant, 
then the theory might need to be revised to accommodate the feature to which the 
judgment is sensitive. 
It seems, by this process, that experimental metaphysics has some philosophical 
relevance. 
 What I hope to do with the remainder of this project is to conduct experiments 
that determine to which features of cases of cause by omission people’s judgments are 
responsive. I have hypothesized that norms will be the psychologically efficacious 
difference between diverging judgments. If this is true, I will then argue that norms are 
metaphysically significant. 
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Cause by Omission and Its Problems 
Saying, “if Mary had watered my plant, it wouldn’t have died,” is an ordinary 
way to identify Mary not watering my plant as the cause of its death. But there are 
problems with this statement. For one, if I identify Mary’s omitted action as the cause, I 
seemingly admit an inordinate number of omissions as causes. For any counterfactual 
statement containing the omitted action is true (e.g. if Hillary Clinton had watered my 
plant, it wouldn’t have died). The statement, moreover, is mysterious because it is not 
clear why one protasis is more salient than any alternatives such as “if I hadn’t gone to 
Bismarck.” There are many more problems with the admission of omissions as causes. In 
this section, I will outline a few of those problems and the solutions some philosophers 
have proposed. 
Problems with Omissions 
Although they have significant problems, counterfactual theories of causation are 
widely accepted in psychology and in philosophy.
38
  Researchers often assume that 
people use counterfactual reasoning to identify causes. Their reasoning can be 
schematized as: 
e counterfactually depends on c just in case if c had not occurred, e would not 
have occurred.
39
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The idea is that people use counterfactual reasoning to say c caused e. For instance, when 
I judge that my cat’s meowing caused me to wake up, I reason that ‘if my cat hadn’t been 
excessively meowing, I wouldn’t have woken up’. 
 There are a number of issues with counterfactual accounts of causation. One is 
that causes, under this account, seemingly lack oomph or physical force, a key component 
of many theories of causation.
40
 That is, when we think that c causes e, some might 
assume that this means that c physically causes e by some physical relation between the 
events. But the counterfactual account does not require physical connection between a 
cause and its result. Another problem is that there are issues with cases of causal 
preemption and the inability for counterfactual theories to deal with them. Suppose Billy 
and Sue throw rocks at the same bottle, but Sue’s rock hits and breaks the bottle a 
millisecond before Billy’s rock passes through the same point in space, and Billy’s rock 
would have broken the bottle had Sue’s rock not broken it. The counterfactual in this case 
that identifies the cause – if Sue hadn’t thrown the rock at the bottle, it wouldn’t have 
broken – is false, for Billy’s rock would have hit and broken the bottle. 
While these problems deserve attention on their own, I am interested in one 
perennial problem that gives insight into the nature of causation and a possible solution to 
the problems above (and others). This problem is that counterfactual theories allow for 
cause by omission, or the judgment that the omission of an event is the cause of some 
other event. Examples of these sorts of cases are endless. Suppose, for instance, I go on 
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vacation to Bismarck, North Dakota, and I ask my friend, Mary, to water my Gollum 
Jade plant. And suppose that she fails to water it. I might then reason: 
CF1: “If Mary had watered my plant, it wouldn’t have died.” 
This reasoning identifies the omission of Mary watering my plant as the cause of death. 
We might also consider some more common examples. The lack of vitamin D causes 
rickets. Professor Smith not showing up to class caused the class to get cancelled. Not 
brushing one’s teeth causes cavities. It is a very common experience for us to judge 
omitted events as causes. 
A theory that allows for cause by omission, however, engenders some serious 
metaphysical problems. One is that if we accept omissions as causes, an infinite number 
of omissions count as legitimate causes.  For if an omission of an event is a cause, any 
omitted event can qualify as a cause. By this reasoning, if we accept CF1, we should also 
accept: 
CF2: “If George Bush had watered my plant, it wouldn’t have died.” 
because both counterfactuals are true. Since these statements identify not watering my 
plant as the cause of its death, we can claim that anyone’s not watering my plant caused 
its death. Following Menzies, I will call this the problem of profligate causes.
4142
 
This problem is both a psychological concern and a metaphysical one. The 
psychological problem is that people can seemingly intuit an infinite number of omissive 
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causes, leaving it a mystery why human psychology ignores most of the omissions that 
could prevent the result from occurring. The metaphysical worry is that to count some 
omission as having a metaphysical causal status is to count any omission (all omissions 
being equal) as having that status. Accepting an omission as a cause results in the 
acceptance of too many omissions as causes. That is, if omissions count as causes, then 
there are countless causes. For instance, if omissions are causes, then I can say things like 
“John not writing his great novel caused you not to be as happy as you could have been.” 
But this result seems very unintuitive. In this paper, I deal with the metaphysical concern. 
Blocking this concern about metaphysically real profligate causes, I believe, 
requires an explanation for how some omissions metaphysically differ from others with 
respect to their causal powers. Specifically, if all omissions are equal, then we must either 
1) bite the bullet and accept profligate causes or 2) deny the causal status of omissions. 
Both consequences seem counterintuitive. And it seems as though there is some natural 
way to distinguish omissive causes from omissions that lack causal status. But this view 
requires an argument. 
Denying Cause by Omission 
 While no one I have read will bite the bullet and accept profligate causes, many 
philosophers are willing to avoid the problem of profligate causes by rejecting the causal 
status of omissions. One way to do so is by arguing that causes are necessarily physically 
connected to their effects. In “Causes are Physically Connected to Their Effects,” Phil 
Dowe does just this, and he argues that causes by omission are simply quasi-causes. He 
maintains that - in general – causes and effects are physically connected. He accepts an 
abstract notion that: 
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CQ1. A causal process is a world-line of an object that possesses a conserved 
quantity. 
CQ2. A causal interaction is an intersection of world-lines that involves 
exchange of a conserved quantity.
43
 
By this account, Dowe only accepts a causal status for events that are strictly physically 
connected. So, we can say that my throwing the rock caused the window to break because 
there is a physical connection (an exchange of a conserved quantity) between the event of 
my throwing the rock and the window breaking. Nonetheless, we cannot, by this theory, 
say that the lack of vitamin C causes scurvy because there is no physical connection 
between a non-event and the event of having scurvy.  
Dowe, nonetheless, has a way to account for the often-used language about 
omissions as causes. He accepts a notion of quasi-causation, which is when an omission 
of an event has “the mere possibility of genuine causation.”44 In the case of omissions, 
they are quasi-causes by omission; that is, not-A quasi-causes B where A and B are 
positive events or facts, not-A is an act of omission, and if A had occurred it would have 
caused B (or prevented not-B). So, he accepts that cause by omission is a quasi-cause 
because it is a possible cause that prevents the result. By this account, not brushing his 
teeth quasi-causes John to get cavities because if he had brushed his teeth, that event 
would have prevented his cavities. 
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Dowe argues that his view better explains the range of intuitions that people have 
about omissions and causation.
45
 Consider: 
CS1: “Not treating the patient caused her to die” 
And 
 CS2: “Not throwing the rock caused the window not to break.” 
Specifically, his account can explain why people think CS1 is a case of causation and 
why CS2 is not one; each, his theory suggests, is a case of quasi-causation, and the 
difference between them is purely psychological. The theories that suggest omissions are 
causes, claims Dowe, rely too heavily on intuitions. These intuitions, he suggests, support 
quasi-causation more than actual causation. 
The notion of quasi-causation, however, has issues. It does, in this case, seem that 
limitless events are quasi-causation that would, under his theory, be indistinguishable 
from what people want to call ‘causes by omission’. His view, moreover, seems too 
restrictive. The view would seem to limit a causal statement like: 
CS3: “An increase in the company’s profits caused the stock’s price to go up” 
because there is no physical connection between a company’s profits and its stock price.46 
Of course, there are a few plausible ways for him to account for this apparent restriction. 
Nonetheless, there seems to be an emphasis on intuitions in the literature. That is, all 
accounts suggest that intuitions help determine the correct theory about cause by 
omission. 
The Intuitive Acceptance of Cause by Omission 
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While some views on cause by omission are too theoretically restrictive, other 
accounts claim the authority of intuition. Jonathan Schaffer argues that negative causation 
is genuine causation, thus causes need not be physically connected to their effects.
47
 In 
his essay, Schaffer gives a number of cases and his intuitions about these cases. For 
instance, he considers that the lack of vitamin D causes rickets. Under any notion of 
causation - counterfactual, statistical, agential, evidential, explanatory, or otherwise - our 
judgment of a cause may include an omission as a cause. These intuitions about cases 
serve as the basis of his argument.
48
 Schaffer accepts negative causation where the 
genuine cause seems to be an absence or omission. For instance, the absence of androgen 
in rats causes feminine behavior (rats that were castrated or given anti-androgen drugs 
display a female pattern of lordosis). 
 Schaffer argues against a number of philosophers – like Dowe - who think that 
causation involves a physical connection between events. That is, they think that if 
billiard ball A causes ball B to go into the corner pocket, then the causal relation involves 
a physical connection. Omissions, by this account, cannot be causes because non-
occurrences cannot be physical connections. This generalization, says Schaffer, is hasty; 
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for it seems that there must be a reason why we have all of the intuitions that he provides 
about negative causation. 
 While Schaffer spends the bulk of his time giving arguments against those who 
think causes must be physically related to their effects, he gives little in the way of a 
positive argument in favor of a causal view that allows negative causes as causes. 
Schaffer explains his intuitive judgments and takes a lesson about causation. It seems to 
him that causation itself has to do with making a difference.
49
 So, for him, causation has a 
counterfactual feature - as many philosophers agree - but it also has a comparative feature 
of difference making. So, where scurvy counterfactually depends on the lack of Vitamin 
C, what picks it out as a cause is that the lack of the vitamin or the presence of it makes a 
difference to whether or not a person has scurvy. 
Against Schaffer, one could argue that 1) any case of negative causation can be 
modeled as a case of positive causation and 2) our intuitions of negative causation can be 
flawed. First, consider an ordinary example: rickets. Rickets is caused by the absence of 
vitamin D. That is a folk judgment of actual causation that can be stated as token 
causation or as type causation. If, however, a model of rickets is created, we may change 
our minds about the cases showing cause by absence. Rickets is caused not by the lack of 
vitamin D but by the body taking calcium and other minerals from bones to use in bodily 
functions when there is not a sufficient amount of vitamin D. Specifically, when the body 
lacks vitamin D, a hormone is released that extracts calcium from bones to use in normal 
functioning. It seems then that it is not the absence of vitamin D that causes rickets - 
although it may be a causal intermediary; instead, it seems that the release of the hormone 
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causes rickets. Hence, we may in cases like these be conflating our intuition with a 
physicalist scientific notion of causation. 
This argument above is an appealing route for some philosophers, but I think that 
it’s ultimately flawed, and I will return to it later. In short, I have two responses. First, the 
difference maker in the rickets case is not the physical cause of the hormone – but the 
absence of vitamin D. So, it is difficult to say that the hormone is the actual cause. 
Second, the tendentious position of positive, physical causation is flawed. We may want 
to look at causal pluralism (as I will do later). 
The Intuition of Salience 
There is a related difficulty with counterfactuals. Even if we develop a precise 
account of causation and omission, it remains difficult to determine how people pick out 
the relevant counterfactual statements. Precisely, it is mysterious that people identify 
Mary’s omission (in CF1) as the cause instead of my trip, as in: 
CF3: “If I hadn’t gone to Bismarck for a week, my plant wouldn’t have died.” 
Particularly in cases of cause by omission, it is difficult to determine how people identify 
these counterfactuals. CF1, CF2, CF3, and other positive events are a part of a causal 
structure, yet people identify only a particular omission as the token cause. Let us call 
this intuition to identify one omission as the cause the intuition of salience.
50
 
The problem of profligate causes and the conflicting intuition of salience have led 
philosophers to some diverse conclusions about omissions. This conflict leads Bernstein 
to see salience as a metaphysical concept, Beebee to distinguish cause from causal 
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explanation,
51
 and Hall to develop a kind of causal pluralism.
52
 All in all, there are many 
ways to solve these two problems related to omissive causes, but none seems entirely 
adequate. 
Possible Explanations for the Salience of Omissions 
These two problems have a few possible solutions that have been explored. Judith 
Thomson gives an account of the intuition of salience by appealing to fault; that is, she 
thinks that actual causes are those states of affair for which we ascribe fault. 
Interestingly, Thomson does not think there are negative events.
53
 As there are no 
negative persons (e.g. non-Obama), there are no spooky non-events. Specifically, there 
are no negative events that can count as omissions or absences. For instance, Carl 
brushing his teeth is an event, but Carl not brushing his teeth is not one. 
There are, by her account, negative states of affairs. So, Carl not brushing his 
teeth is a negative state of affairs. Moreover, she thinks that states of affairs are causal. 
She gives an account of what it is for a state of affairs to cause something.
54
 She claims, 
"If neither x nor y is an event [e.g. a state of affairs], then for x to cause y is for some 
event [p] appropriately related to x to cause some event [q] appropriately related to y."
55
 
So, the state of affairs where my cat meows in the morning can be said to cause the state 
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of affairs where I wake up because some event - my cat’s meowing - caused the event of 
me waking up. 
She also accepts that an omission is a state of affairs.
56
 So, some omission can be 
causal. For instance, John not studying for his test caused him to get a poor grade. John 
not studying and his receiving a poor grade are states of affairs. The event of John going 
out and partying, however, brought about the event where he performed poorly on the 
examination and the state of affairs where he received a poor grade. 
Thomson, however, notices that something is missing in this account causation; if 
one accepts a counterfactual theory or an interventionist theory (even a Humean theory), 
it is difficult to determine the relevant counterfactual statement: that is, it is difficult to 
determine which counterfactual dependence claim is said to be the causal one (which 
state of affairs counterfactually depends on the caused state of affairs). This noted 
incompleteness is, I believe, Thomson trying to account for the intuition of salience. 
To explain this intuition, Thomson argues that common sense can help us.
57
 
Specifically, common sense will show us that "something normative is at work" in cases 
of cause by omission (or any cause really).
58
 For her, the normative feature of causation 
is fault or blaming; to be precise about this, she develops the following: 
Principle P: If x is at fault for Y, x causes y.
59
 
By this principle, the state of affairs where Mary does not water my plant causes the state 
of affairs where my plant dies, for Mary’s omission puts her at fault for the death. 
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 Immediately, one might object that Thomson describes a psychological account of 
our intuitions or our causal cognitive process. Specifically, one might propose that 
Thomson’s account describes why people pick out states of affairs as causes, but in a way 
that is not metaphysically important. If we discuss causation in terms of fault, it seems as 
though our intuitions are biased or distorted by a normative consideration. 
But there is another more charitable way to take her thesis. This view is to suggest 
that blame is part of our conceptual competence at making causal judgments. Thomson, I 
believe, argues for this second interpretation. 
This view, however, cannot be correct, for we make causal judgments without 
ascribing blame (i.e. blame is not a necessary condition for causation) and sometimes 
where we blame, we do not ascribe causation (where someone could have prevented an 
action that causes harm). We may then want to look for a broader account of the intuition 
of salience. 
Norms 
Sarah McGrath advances the idea that causation has a normative feature. First, she 
reiterates a dilemma:  
D: Either there is no causation by omission, or there is far more than common 
sense says there is.
60
 
This dilemma is that which arises out of the problem of profligate causes. For explication, 
we can imagine a common case of Mary who lives in Bismarck, North Dakota. When she 
takes a trip to Miramar, Florida, Mary asks her neighbor, Dirk, to water her plants. Chaz, 
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Mary's other neighbor, overhears Mary asking Dirk to water her plants and anticipates 
that Dirk will not water the plants. On the phone, Mary mentions to her cousin, Aubrey 
(who is in Nicaragua), that she is going away and needs her plants watered. When Mary 
goes away, Dirk does not water the plants, so it seems that Dirk not watering the plants 
caused them to die. But because this cause is an omissions, any omission of this type can 
be the cause (the problem of profligate causes): Chaz not watering and Aubrey not 
watering the plants all count as causes. So, if there is cause by omission (against the first 
lemma of the dilemma), then there are far more omissions than make sense (as in the 
second lemma). To ignore omissions (first lemma), however, requires an explanation of 
why common sense is wrong. 
McGrath’s account assumes our intuitive judgments are correct about cause by 
omission. She then proposes the Normal Account. By normal, she means:  
Normal: It is normal for X to P iff X is supposed to P. 
Hearts pump blood. Hence, it is normal because hearts are supposed to pump blood. The 
normal account says: 
Normal Account: Some would-be-preventers C(O) of E are such that relative 
to some actual standard S, had E been prevented, it would 
have been normal for C(O) to prevent E. 
More clearly, an event type O - one that has been omitted - causes E iff O, and O is a 
normal would-be-preventer of E. The important part of her proposal is that it makes cause 
by omission normative, which is highly contested among people who suggest that 
causation is entirely physical. 
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McGrath thinks that this analysis helps us resist the dilemma and that we can rely 
on our intuitions about cause by omission. To me, her account seems plausible, and my 
intuitions accord with her own. But I think that this view must first be tested to ensure 
that the features of the cases that she finds salient are really the salient ones. 
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Cause by Omission and Experiments 
 Experiments have indirectly dealt with the intuition of salience. In this section, I 
will examine studies that elucidate the apparent salience of some omissions and suggest 
the problem of profligate causes is a less serious issue for ordinary causal judgments. 
There are many cases where relevant omissions - while they may be considered 
causes under a nonrelationist view - are not judged to be causes. In one study, Livengood 
and Machery explore these cases. They perform experiments that suggest 1) the folk 
sometimes deny the causal status of omissions and 2) the folk do not conflate causal 
explanation and genuine causation.
61
 
 In one experiment, Livengood and Machery gave subjects the following vignette: 
Susan had to climb a rope in gym class. Susan was a very good climber, and she 
climbed all the way to the rafters. 
 
The authors set two conditions. In the causation condition, they asked: 
On a scale of 1 to 7, 1 indicating that you totally disagree and 7 indicating that 
you totally agree, how much do you agree with the following claim? ‘The rope 
not breaking caused Susan to reach the rafters.’ 
 
In the explanation condition, the authors asked: 
On a scale of 1 to 7, 1 indicating that you totally disagree and 7 indicating that 
you totally agree, how much do you agree with the following claim? ‘Susan 
reached the rafters because the rope did not break.’62  
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For the causation condition, the mean answer was 2.73. For the explanation condition, the 
mean answer was 3.50. As predicted, the mean answer in the causation condition was 
significantly lower than the neutral answer, 4. Against their prediction, they also found a 
statistically significant difference between mean answers in the two conditions. 
To reiterate their results, they found that the folk sometimes deny omissions as 
genuine causes. Where some nonrelationists about causation would identify an omission 
as a cause, the folk did not. Against their prediction, participants were also less likely to 
say the omission of the rope breaking was a cause as opposed to an explanation.
63
 This 
result suggests that people generally distinguish actual cause from causal explanation.
64
 
The folk, however, do sometimes identify omissions as causes. It is common for 
someone to claim, “Mary not watering your plants caused them to die.” We, moreover, 
think that the folk identify not watering the plant as a genuine cause – not simply an 
explanation. The problem is to figure out when the folk do so, or to determine when the 
intuition of salience identifies an omission as a cause. 
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Exploring the Intuition of Salience 
While this intuition is particularly useful for discussing omissive causes, it is 
important for causal judgments in general. One of the leading researchers on this intuition 
is Knobe, agreeing with small coterie of philosophers, who thinks that this type of causal 
selection is extra-structural.
65
 In much of his work, Knobe argues that people’s moral 
judgments are an integral part of the process by which people make folk causal 
judgments; for him, there is single underlying mechanism to explain morality’s influence 
on causation.
66
 
Knobe’s view, however, has not been the dominant position about causal 
ascription. For a long time, most psychologists and philosophers interested in how 
ordinary people make judgments about causation held – what Knobe refers to as – a 
person-as-a-scientist view.
67
 Under this view, people make causal judgments in a way 
that is analogous to the way in which scientists make causal judgments; as a scientist uses 
rigorous statistical methods to determine the cause of some event, the ordinary person 
uses folk statistical methods. While the ordinary person does not use the rigorous 
mathematical methods and models that a scientist would use to identify a cause, she 
discerns cause by using informal statistical methods. That is, proponents of the view aver 
that the people use the same basic methodology as systematic scientists - only their 
mathematical techniques are less stringent. 
                                               
65
 What I mean by ‘extra-structural’ is that one can develop a node diagram to represent the 
causal scenario but still lack a clear notion of the cause in that scenario. 
66
 See Knobe, Joshua. “Folk Judgments of Causation” and  Knobe, Joshua. “Person as Scientist, 
Person as Moralist.” 
67
 Knobe, “Folk Judgments,” 1. 
 41 
 
Researchers corroborated the person-as-a-scientist theory in many experiments. In 
one study, researchers gave participants a vignette about George, who writes a profound 
paper and sends it to some journals for publication. A reviewer rejects his article, so 
George wants to know the cause of his rejection. Researchers asked participants about 
two cases; in one case, almost all of the journals reject George’s paper, and in the other, 
only the one reviewer rejects it. Subjects claimed that George’s paper caused his rejection 
in case 1, and they said that the reviewer caused George’s rejection in case 2. The results, 
argue the proponents of the person-as-a-scientist view, suggest that people use folk 
statistics to make causal judgments.
68
 Specifically, in case 1, participants recognize the 
invariance in George’s rejection rate, so they deem his paper as the cause. In case 2, 
participants recognize the statistical abnormality of the reviewer’s rejections, so they 
deem the reviewer to be the cause. 
There are two important clarifications. One is that the exactness of folk statistics 
is irrelevant; this experiment shows one way in which people’s causal cognition is 
analogous to scientific inquiry. That is, the important part of the person-as-a-scientist 
view is that the folk make causal judgments using a cognitive process analogous to the 
methods used in systematic science; folk statistics and actual statistics are not identical. 
The second point of clarification is that this view does not aim to delineate all factors that 
influence, interfere with, or distort intuitions. A person’s emotions, moral qualms, and 
other influences can interfere with causal judgment. If subjects, for instance, were told 
that the reviewer secretly hated George, then subjects’ responses would be distorted (they 
might ascribe cause to the reviewer in both cases). Rather than confronting these 
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influences, the view simply describes the fundamental nature of folk causal 
competencies: that they are, at base, like systematic science.
69
 
Knobe, however, is suspicious of what many psychologists have called distortions 
and biases. As noted above, many researchers suggest that moral judgment biases causal 
intuitions. Knobe, in turn, argues that people’s moral judgments are an integral part of the 
process by which people make folk causal judgments; for him, there is single underlying 
mechanism to explain morality’s influence on causation. Specifically, he thinks that 
people’s moral judgments determine their selection of the relevant counterfactual in the 
causal scenario. This view is the person-as-a-moralist view. 
To bolster the theory, Knobe cites the pen experiment mentioned in chapter 
one.
70,71
 To recall, the results show that people overwhelmingly judge Professor Smith to 
be the cause of the problem and that they do not judge the administrative assistant to be 
the cause. The events are statistically the same. The researchers, Knobe and Fraser, 
suggest that the principal difference of the actions is their moral statuses; Professor Smith 
is not supposed to take the pens, while the administrative assistant is permitted to do so. 
If the moral difference between the two subjects’ actions elicits a different causal 
ascription, then the study suggests that people do not make causal judgments as scientists 
make them (i.e. considering only statistics). 
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Knobe posits his own hypothesis about causal ascription in response to the data 
on the moral influence on causal judgment.
72
  The results from the above experiment 
show that moral judgments are part of the process by which causal judgments are made.  
He rejects the view that moral judgments distort the informal scientific methods that folk 
use to make causal judgments.
73
 Rather, Knobe argues that there may, in fact, be a single 
underlying mechanism to explain how the folk use statistical methods and moral 
consideration when they make causal judgments. By this theory, the folk have as a part of 
their competency in making causal judgments a hybrid scientific and moral mechanism.
74
  
We can call this the person-as-moral-scientist view. 
Under this view, Knobe thinks that moral judgments are the integral part of 
people’s underlying competence that helps them identify the relevant counterfactual 
alternatives in causal judgments.
75
  In his work, Knobe highlights three principles for 
counterfactual reasoning. 
1. People are inclined to consider counterfactuals in which statistically usual 
events replace statistically unusual ones. 
 
2. People are inclined to consider counterfactuals in which good events 
replace bad events. 
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3. Unless there is some specific reason to think about a given counterfactual, 
people are inclined to classify it as irrelevant and not give it any further 
thought.
76
  
 
Knobe’s critical principle is two. This principle allows him to suggest that moral 
judgments are a part of the mechanism that people use to make causal judgments. 
Returning to the pen case, we can clarify Knobe’s person-as-a-moral-scientist 
view. When judging the cause of receptionist’s problem, the subjects use: 
CF4: “If Professor Smith hadn’t taken a pen, the receptionist would’ve had 
one.” 
Using principle two, subjects replace a bad event - Professor Smith taking the pen 
when he should not have - with a good one - Professor Smith not taking a pen. They do 
not, however, use: 
CF5: “If the administrative assistant hadn’t taken a pen, then the receptionist 
would’ve had one.” 
Participants, Knobe suggests, do not use CF5 because there is no reason to 
consider it (principle three) and because it is not a morally bad action (principle two). 
Precisely, CF5 satisfies none of the three principles. 
Under this theory, if the causal judgment is about a morally relevant event, then 
the subjects’ moral judgment is a part of their underlying competency. Morality then is 
not interfering with causal judgment - but helping to determine it. 
But Knobe’s initial focus on moral norms may be a bit too restrictive. In “Cause 
and Norm,” Hitchcock and Knobe propose an alternate theory for how people identify the 
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relevant counterfactual statements in causal judgments.
77
 They posit an underlying 
mechanism that incorporates norms instead of moral judgments. Specifically, they 
suggest that people make causal judgments by discerning the best way to intervene and 
prevent the result. The best way to intervene, they argue, is to replace abnormal events 
with normal ones. I call this the norm view, which states that people rely on extra-
structural norms to identify relevant counterfactuals in causal ascriptions.
78
 
 While they have a different aim in their paper, they ask: how do people choose the 
relevant counterfactual? To present this inquiry, they discuss a case of causal preemption: 
Assassin and Backup go on a mission to poison Victim. Assassin puts poison in 
Victim’s drink. Backup stands at the ready; if Assassin hadn’t poisoned the drink, 
Backup would have. Both poisons are lethal. Victim drinks the poison and dies. 
 
The obvious, relevant, and intuitive counterfactual is: 
CF6: “If Assassin hadn’t poisoned Victim, Victim wouldn’t have died.” 
But this counterfactual is false because if Assassin had not poisoned the drink, Backup 
would have. Backup’s action, however, is not a cause of Victim’s death, while Assassin’s 
action is a cause; hence, it would be wrong to say that Backup in any way caused 
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Victim’s death. So, the authors ask: how do people decide which counterfactual 
statements are relevant?
79
 
 Hitchcock and Knobe amend Knobe’s earlier understanding of how people choose 
counterfactuals by adopting an interventionist theory of causation. Under this theory, they 
hold that while people can identify causal structures, what makes them pick out a specific 
counterfactual is a purpose: making a difference. Strictly, people identify the 
counterfactual statements that would prevent the result by intervention. For instance, to 
prevent Victim’s death, we need to preclude Assassin’s actions. So, we judge Assassin’s 
action as the cause (CF6). 
But people do not pick out any intervention. It is true that if Counter Assassin had 
murdered both Assassin and Backup, Victim would not have died. Nonetheless, this 
counterfactual is highly unusual, abnormal, and irrelevant. Hitchcock and Knobe argue 
that people pick out the intervention that would prevent the action in normalized versions 
of the scenario. They write, “In general, while causal structure identifies all of the factors 
that could be manipulated...to effect a change in the outcome, the actual causes are the 
factors that should be manipulated” (italics are theirs).80 By this, they mean that people 
assume a situation that is more normal than the actual situation they are making a causal 
judgment about. People then identify what should be done to prevent the action. This 
intuitive interventionism engenders people’s causal judgment. 
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To be exact, we can see this process in three steps. First, people classify events 
from normal to abnormal.
81
 For example, Assassin poisoning Victim is a normal 
situation, while Assassin with Backup is an abnormal one. Second, when confronted with 
an abnormal event, people then identify the counterfactuals that best normalize the 
situation. People, for example, will use CF6 instead of considering a counterfactual that 
incorporates Backup. Third, people identify the best way to prevent the result (e.g. 
prevent Victim’s death). These three steps summarize the norm view.82 
We may then return to the pen case for contrast with Knobe’s earlier person-as-a-
moral-scientist view.
83
 The two behaviors do not differ in typicality; it is routine for both 
Professor Smith and the administrative assistant to take pens. Statistically, the events are 
the same. There are also multiple ways to intervene; one, for instance, could prevent the 
administrative assistant from taking a pen. The administrative assistant, however, violates 
no norms, while Professor Smith does. Since Professor Smith’s actions are abnormal, the 
counterfactual about him is relevant, while the counterfactual about the administrative 
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assistant is not. Thus, stopping Professor Smith from taking a pen is the best way to 
prevent the secretary’s problem. 
The norm view, hence, explains the intuition of salience: in a phrase, a cause is 
salient if a norm is broken.
84
 That is, when people use counterfactual reasoning to 
decipher causal scenarios, they identify the most abnormal counterfactual statement. 
Then they normalize that statement, which identifies it as the cause. Suppose that subject 
S has a range X0- Xn (in the form ‘~a  ~b’) of counterfactual statements (relevant or 
not) to describe a causal scenario. The most abnormal Xn that will normalize the scenario 
will be used to identify the actual cause of the scenario. 
There is, however, a serious objection to Knobe’s view. Some researchers posit 
the person-as-a-bumbling-scientist view (in some articles, Knobe also calls this the 
alternative explanation).
85
  Under this view, the folk make causal judgments using folk 
scientific methods and statistics, but they mess up. Proponents of this explanation suggest 
that motivational bias distort or bias the true causal judgment from the folk scientific 
method.
86
  The folk moral judgments - possibly even their emotions - distort their correct 
(i.e. statistical or scientific) judgments about causation. In sum, the moral judgment - or 
otherwise - interferes with the causal judgment. People’s competencies for making causal 
judgments are nonmoral, but moral biases impede people’s ability to correctly make 
causal ascriptions. While there are many forms of this view, one called the blaming 
objection is an important one.  This objection claims that people are conflating their 
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assignment of blame with their causal judgment. Because subjects, for instance, want to 
blame Professor Smith in the pen scenario, they deem him the cause. Subjects’ moral 
judgment, in other words, distorts their causal judgment.
87
 
Knobe and other researchers have found a plethora of ways to combat this 
alternative explanation. Two significant ways of doing so are to develop experiments 
where 1) the subject is not blameworthy for the result yet remains the cause or 2) the 
cause is not an agent. In an experiment of the latter type, Knobe used the following 
vignette: 
A machine is set up in such a way that it will short circuit if both the black wire 
and the red wire touch the battery at the same time. The machine will not short 
circuit if just one of these wires touches the battery. The black wire is designated 
as the one that is supposed to touch the battery, while the red wire is supposed to 
remain in some other part of the machine. 
 
One day, the black wire and the red wire both end up touching the battery at the 
same time. There is a short circuit. 
 
Subjects were asked to agree or disagree with one of two statements: one stating that the 
fact that the red wire touching the battery caused the machine to short circuit and another 
stating that the fact that the black wire touched the battery caused the machine to short 
circuit. Subjects judged the fact that the red wire touched the battery to be the cause of 
the short circuit.
88
 In other words, the theory explains that the subjects made this causal 
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judgment because of normative features of the case and not because of a blaming 
distortion. 
Experiments, Salience, and Omissions 
The norm view interestingly implies that people will sometimes pick out the 
counterfactual that contains an omission as a cause. From the above research, we can 
expect that the folk will ascribe abnormal events causal status. Therefore, while 
Livengood and Machery’s study suggests the folk sometimes deny the causal status of 
omissions, we now have a good predictor for when omissions count as causes; 
specifically, the folk will identify omissions as causes when an event that can prevent the 
result breaks a norm. 
To test this view, I designed a study with the following vignette: 
Bash Ball is a game played on a large outdoor course with a lot of hiding places. 
In the game, there are Runners and there are Bashers. Runners are allowed to run 
wherever they want to on the course, but if they get hit by a Bash Ball, they are 
out of the game. Runners are also allowed to talk to one another and strategize. 
Bashers must remain in one spot for the entire game, and they must try to hit the 
other team’s Runner’s with one of their Bash Balls. Bashers are allowed to talk to 
their team’s Runners and tell them where the other team’s Bashers are. The goal 
of Bash Ball is to get as many of the team’s Runners to the opposing team’s Zone 
as possible. 
 
Zach, Harmon, and a few other friends are on a team playing Bash Ball against 
another team. Zach is a Basher, and Harmon is a Runner. At one point in the 
game, Zach spots one of the other team’s Bashers behind a tree on the other side 
of the field. Later on, Harmon sees Zach and runs past him. Knowing that he is 
allowed to talk to Runners, Zach does not tell Harmon where the other team’s 
Basher is. Soon after, the Basher that Zach spotted hits Harmon with a Bash Ball. 
Harmon is out for the remainder of the game. 
 
Do you agree with the following statement? 
 
Zach not telling Harmon where the other team’s Basher is caused Harmon to get 
out of the game. 
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Yes/No 
 
How confident are you in your answer? 
 
(Not at all Confident) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (Very Confident) 
 
There are two conditions. In the abnormal condition (above), Bashers are allowed to talk 
to Runners on their team, and in the normal condition they are not allowed to do so.
89
 
The abnormal condition is more abnormal than the normal condition because participants 
expect Zach to tell Harmon about the Basher – specifically, when there is not a rule 
prohibiting him from doing so, he is supposed to tell Harmon about the Basher (so their 
team can win) – yet he does not do so: he breaks a norm. Hence, in the abnormal 
condition, 72.4% of participants claimed that Zach’s omission caused Harmon to get out 
of the game, while only 24.1% claimed this in the normal condition.
90
 
 This result is revealing. The causal structure is the same in each case; the event of 
Harmon getting hit or other conditions seem to be positive causes, and the omission may 
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 The only difference between the vignettes is that in the normal condition the word ‘not’ was 
inserted twice to specify that Bashers were not allowed to talk to Runners. 
90
 In the abnormal condition, 35 (N = 29) participants on Amazon Turk (62.1% Male, 34.5% 
Female, 3.4% Decline to Answer, and 3.4% Other) responded to a survey for $0.20 
compensation. Of the participants, 21 (72.4%) answered ‘Yes’, and 8 (26.6%) answered ‘No’. 
These results are statistically significant (χ2=5.828, df=1, p=0.0158). In the normal condition, 35 
participants (N = 29) on Amazon Turk (48.3% Male, 51.7% Female) responded to a survey for 
$0.20 compensation. Of the participants, 7 (24.1%) answered ‘Yes’, and 22 (75.9%) answered 
‘No’. These results are statistically significant, (χ2=7.759, df=1, p=0.0053). On a weighted scale 
(1 being ‘Very Confident’ for the ‘No’ answer 14 being ‘Very Confident’ for the ‘Yes’ answer 
(7.5 is the neutral answer)), the mean answer in the abnormal condition was 9.79 (SD = 3.947) 
and 4.55 (SD = 4.672) in the normal condition. The differences are statistically significant (t(58) 
= 4.561, p<.001, two-tailed). In each condition, the surveys were the same except for the word 
‘no’ inserted twice in the normal condition. Participants were also given basic comprehension 
questions to ensure that they read the vignette and answered appropriately; those who failed the 
comprehension questions were discarded (6 in the abnormal condition and 6 in the normal 
condition). All participants were from United States. 
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be causally relevant or causal (if one accepts omissions as causes). Despite the causal 
structure, something extra-structural (a broken norm) affects whether or not the 
participants judge an omission to be a cause. To be clear, the omission in the abnormal 
condition was the salient cause because of a normative feature - not a structural feature – 
of the case.
91
 
Discussion of Experiments 
These results carry a lot of weight for the problem of profligate causes and the 
intuition of salience. But I will resolve neither mystery. Instead, I will make a suggestion 
for what these experimental results imply about the metaphysics of omissive causes. 
These results suggest that the intuition of salience has an explanation: the causal 
salience of some omissions is brought about by normative features of the causal scenario. 
This explanation illuminates Livengood and Machery’s results. In their results, the folk 
deny the causal status of an omission because the omission of the broken rope does not 
break a norm. Specifically, the folk do not consider: 
CF7: “If the rope had broken, Susan wouldn’t have made it to the top.” 
because it is an irrelevant counterfactual. Under the norm view, to consider CF7 is to 
consider a scenario that is more abnormal than the one at hand, for the scenario in which 
the rope does not break is already normal. Hence, where one does not need to identify a 
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 A few other experiments support the same conclusion. One experiment using semantic 
integration techniques and the same conditions results in the same finding. Also, when people are 
asked about cause by omission, they tend to always say that omissions are causes. Furthermore, 
the folk seem to accept cause by omission so widely, that there does not seem to be an 
abstract/concrete paradox or any general reticence to accept omissions as causes. It seems that 
people judge omissions or absences to be the same (in terms of causation) as positive events. I 
hope to present much of this data elsewhere. Funding limitation hinders the presentation here. 
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way to prevent the result from occurring, there is no purpose for identifying a broken 
norm in an abnormal scenario as the cause. 
 Livengood and Machery foresee this attack on their project. They argue that while 
“people might argue that the rope not breaking is not the most relevant...cause[,]...This 
reply should be restricted...It is...ad hoc: there is no evidence that people take the rope not 
breaking to be a cause...at all.”92 In an experiment, it would be difficult to show that the 
rope not breaking is not a relevant cause. My study, however, is not ad hoc because I 
bolster my assertion with theory. The approach predicts that in any case where the norm 
view identifies an omission as a cause, the folk agree. If there is one case where the norm 
view should identify an omission as a relevant cause and the folk deny its causal status, 
then one presents a bigger problem. Nevertheless, it seems that the norm view and my 
study account for the intuition of salience and Livengood and Machery’s results. 
 More troubling is the problem of profligate causes. It is important to note that if 
one has an account of the intuition of salience, one can deal with this problem; if we 
know why specific causes are salient and others are not, we have an account of why 
profligate causes are not causes. Thus, we can explain why some omissions are causes. 
I have suggested that this intuition has a normative feature, but stating this does 
not show how an explanation of the intuition of salience deals with the problem of 
profligate causes. To do this, I must flesh out this normative feature.
93
 I can do so in two 
ways. The first is to say our underlying competence at making causal ascriptions relies on 
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 Livengood and Machery, “The Folk Probably Don’t Think,” 123. 
93
 In this project, I, as other theorists have, have used ‘norms’ and ‘normativity’ broadly and 
vaguely. A further and related project for this view is to more precisely define what kind of norms 
are at work. I will discuss this project in my conclusion. 
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norms and normative judgments; this is to say there is a single underlying mechanism for 
making causal ascriptions that relies on our normative judgments.
94
 So, when we judge 
an omission as a cause, the omission is not necessarily a metaphysical cause; rather, it is 
an event that serves the purpose of being the best way for us to prevent the result. By this 
account of the normativity, we cannot fully deal with the problem of profligate causes; at 
best, we can give a psychological account of why the problem does not seem to matter.
95
 
The metaphysical problem, however, persists, for a psychological explanation – without 
further discussion - has little impact on the metaphysical structure. 
 The second way to parse the normativity is to suggest that norms are an essential 
feature of cause by omission (and maybe causation in general); salience, under this 
account, is a metaphysical property that has a normative feature. What the experiments 
are then showing is that the folk make accurate causal judgments and that the 
metaphysical causal structure that informs these judgments has itself a normative feature. 
As I noted earlier, Sarah McGrath holds such a view; in one article, she proposes the 
following: 
o causes e iff o occurs, e occurs, and either Co is normal would-be preventer of e, 
or there is some event e* such that e* causes e, and Co is a normal would-be 
preventer of e*
96
 
 
By her account, omission o causes event e iff o normally prevents e or o normally 
prevents e*, which causes e. While this account needs further explanation, it is one that 
deems causation itself - not simply causal judgments - as normative. Hence, the intuition 
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 This is essentially the norm view. 
95
 This explanation would, however, deal with the psychological problem. 
96
 McGrath, Sarah. “Causation by Omission,” 142. 
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of salience is explained by the metaphysical causal relations that have normative features. 
Unlike the first view, if a view like this one holds, the problem of profligate causes 
ceases to be a problem. For we have an account of salience that shows why specific 
omissions count as causes and why profligate causes are not metaphysically causes. 
Either way we parse this normative feature, omissions qua causes seem to be normative. 
There are, however, some serious objections. Someone may argue that 
normativity has nothing to do with genuine causation. This objection comes in two parts. 
The first part is to say the studies show that our intuitions may be interfered with or 
tainted by norms. For these critics, normativity has nothing to do with the metaphysical 
causal relation. The second part is to develop a metaphysical notion of salience (some 
have done so) that lacks normative consideration.
97
 This metaphysical view suggests that 
our judgments – although they are not always precise – are informed by the metaphysical 
relation. An objector of this type might, for instance, claim that “drought caused the 
famine” is a case where no normative considerations are involved (i.e. there is a non-
normative metaphysical relation). 
This objection, while serious, is fruitless. To deal with the first part, a champion 
of the norm view can challenge opponents to find a causal judgment that lacks a 
normative feature. The opponent may point to the drought case. Knobe, Hitchcock, and 
McGrath, however, have a much wider conception of norms. Under their view, the 
drought case has a normative feature. McGrath, for instance, might claim that it is 
supposed to (normal to) rain; for her, the salience of the omission depends on norms. In 
                                               
97
 Someone may also propose a view that denies a notion of salience and the causal status of 
omissions. 
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response to the first part of the objection, one can claim that it is impossible to find a 
judgment of causation that lacks a normative feature. Hence, if all ordinary causal 
judgments have a normative feature, it is difficult to claim that norms interfere with true 
causal judgments. The objector then needs to explain how this distortion occurs. 
Dealing with the second part of the objection is more challenging, and it deserves 
more consideration than I can give here. But suppose that someone developed a 
metaphysical and non-normative notion of salience. The problem for this view is that a 
metaphysical account relies on intuitive causal judgments that – I have suggested – have 
a normative feature. We could not imagine a metaphysical account that did not appeal to 
– at some point – our intuitive causal judgments. Even if one were to accept causal 
pluralism, acknowledging that one concept of causation has a normative feature, she 
would still rely on this concept to develop a metaphysical concept of omissive causation. 
Hence, without an explanation for the claim that norms distort causal judgments, there is 
no reason to think that genuine causation lacks a normative feature. 
 While more work is required, the experimental evidence seems to suggest that 
omissive causes necessarily have a normative feature. Under some normative accounts of 
the intuition of salience, the problem of profligate causes ceases. Hence, we may, after 
accepting a norm-based metaphysical theory of causation, accept omissive causes. 
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Conclusion 
I have done three things in this project. First, I have given an account of why 
experimental metaphysics is an appropriate methodology for a philosophical project. 
Second, I have bolstered the norm view of causal judgments in experimental philosophy 
(which has a growing consensus) by suggesting that the view holds for omissions. Third, 
I have supported the views of some metaphysicians who think that the salience of the 
actual cause has a normative component. Lastly, I have suggested that the view that I 
hold can – if correct – resolve some problems in the metaphysics of omissions and cause 
by omission. 
This thesis will produce a lot of future projects. First, this project requires further 
experimentation of how the folk treat omissive causes and further discussion about which 
account of normativity is apt. There are two projects that deserve immediate attention. 
The first is to determine what concept(s) of causation ordinary people have and when 
they exhibit it(them). Exploring this project will help determine if there is any non-
normative concept of causation at all.
98
 The second project is to determine more precisely 
what kind of norms (statistical, prescriptive, et cetera) affect or influence the causal 
status of omissions. Understanding these norms will inform the metaphysical 
consequences of this view. Some people are already working on this endeavor (e.g. 
Livengood). The future disagreement seems to be that certain types of norms, typicality 
(by agent or population), and normality are the important feature for causal judgments. 
While some experimental philosophers will argue that Thomson’s fault argument (see 
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 It will also help determine exactly when the folk accept omissions as causes. 
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above) is correct, I suspect that McGrath’s view is more precise, but these views must be 
tested.
99
 
I also think that more work must be done to determine the relationship between 
the abstract/concrete paradox and the normative component of causal judgments. A future 
project will be to look at the semantic memory accounts of the paradox and determine the 
relationship to causal ascriptions. 
Another related project is to examine the results that this project has on a 
perennial question in the metaphysical of causation: is causation ideal or real?
100
 It may 
seem that this project ultimately suggests that causation is ideal – or at least that 
causation depends on people being around to observe it. For if the existence of norms 
depends on people and causation depends on normative features of the world, then 
causation must also depend on people being around. Many philosophers – even recent 
ones – have suggested that this may be the case.101 It does, however, seem obvious that 
causes happen without human presence. In a world without life on it, rock A seemingly 
still causes rock B to break into bits when the two rocks collide. 
To explicate, I can use an example. Suppose there are three people: Chris, Jordan, 
and Quinn. All three live in a world like ours but with entirely different norms. In this 
world, there are two classes of people – upper class and lower class – and upper-class 
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 See Sytsma, Justin; Livengood, Jonathan; and Rose, David (forthcoming). “Two Types of 
Typicality: Rethinking the Role of Statistical Typicality in Ordinary Causal Attributions.” Studies 
in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences. 
100
 I thank Bernard Kobes for pushing me on this problem and for the examples I use below. 
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 Menzies, Peter and Price, Huw. “Causation as a Secondary Quaility.” The British Journal for 
the Philosophy of Science 44 (1993): 187-203. 
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people are not expected to help people in need while the lower-class people are expected 
to do so. Chris and Jordan are upper class, while Quinn is lower class. One day, Jordan 
falls into a toxic waste pit. Because of the norms in this world, Chris is not expected to 
help Jordan, and Quinn is. Chris, nonetheless, has access to a device that rescues people 
from toxic waste pits, and this device is only accessible to upper-class people and can be 
used for a small monetary cost. Quinn can also jump into the pit to save Jordan, but it 
would cost him his life. Neither Chris nor Quinn saves Jordan, and he dies. The question 
is whether Chris or Quinn’s omission caused Jordan’s death. 
It is difficult to make this judgment across worlds, but I think that the point of the 
example is fair. The norm view would predict that Quinn not sacrificing his life for 
Jordan caused Jordan’s death. By our standards, however, we might assert that Chris’s 
omission caused Jordan’s death. What this example suggests is that the norm view treats 
causation as contextual, anthropocentric, and not necessarily real. 
My view, however – which accords with the views of many philosophers – does 
not necessarily suggest that causation is ideal; there are ways around this consequence. 
One way is to say that I have been talking about actual cause – not necessarily causation 
in general. When we discuss actual cause, we are discussing the event that can best be 
modified to prevent the result, while causation involves a much more intricate and 
baroque linkage of events. That is to say that the only idealized aspect of causation is the 
actual cause. 
Another way to obviate this result is to be a causal pluralist – a view that many 
philosophers support (e.g. Ned Hall and Christopher Hitchcock). One could say that at 
least one concept of causation – for instance, dependence causation – accords with the 
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norm view. Hence, at least one concept idealizes causation. Other concepts of causation, 
however, are not necessarily ideal. There seems to be a number of ways around this 
consequence. 
While these future projects require time and discussion, this project at least makes 
a suggestion for the foundation of our intuitions about cause by omission. 
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